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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. section 78-2-2(4) UCA 78-2a-3 (2) (h) .

ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL.
I.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in making an
award of alimony?

The standard of review in considering an award of alimony is
an abuse of discretion standard.
P.2d 877, 879 (Utah App. 1995).

Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905
Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209,

1211 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
Alimony was one of the central issues of the case.
85).

(R. at 84-

The issue was preserved for appeal in the arguments of both

counsel.

(R. at 183-189).

II.

Did the trial court err in granting appellee an
equitable interest in the home?

As above the standard of review is an abuse of discretion
standard.
1995).

Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah App.

Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App.), cert,

denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) .
Distribution of property including an interest in the home,
was one of the central issues of the case.

(R. at 84-85).

The

issue was preserved for appeal in the arguments of both counsel.
(R. at 183-189).

1

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes or rules of
central importance to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:

This is a divorce case with

contested issues involving the division of personal and real
property, and alimony.
B.

Statement of Facts: The parties were married in 1992.

(R. at 42) .

They separated four years later on June 6, 1996.

(R. at 8, 86). Divorce proceedings followed.

(R. at 1)

time of the marriage each of the parties owned a home.
85-86) .

The trial court awarded appellee

At the
(R. at

(hereinafter

defendant) an equitable interest in appellant's

(hereinafter

plaintiff) home in the amount of $12,000.00 (R. at 48). The
trial court also awarded alimony to appellee in the amount of
$500.00 per month for four years.

(R. at 4 7 ) . The defendant

purchased another home after separation.

(R. at 49) .

Both

parties were employed before and during the marriage, and after
separation.
C.

(See exhibits 48, 49, 50 and 54).

Proceedings Below:

Plaintiff filed the complaint in

this matter on June 18, of 1996.
on July 22, 1996.
January 30, 1997) .
Jan 31, 1997.
1997.

(R. at 1 ) . Defendant answered

(R. at 5 ) . Plaintiff's counsel withdrew on
(R. at 29) .

Substitute counsel appeared on

(R. at 34). Trial was held on May 14, and 19,

(R. at 39, 42). Findings of fact, conclusions of law and

a decree of divorce were entered on July 2, 1997.
2

(R. at 46,

57) .

Notice of appeal was filed by substituted counsel on July

17, 1997)

(R. at 69). Notice of cross-appeal was filed on July

31, 1997.

(R. at 73).

(Note:

Plaintiff's current counsel was

retained after the docketing statement was filed, and the
briefing period had commenced).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The first issue on appeal considers whether the trial court
abused its discretion in making an award of alimony.

The

standard of review in considering an award of alimony is an abuse
of discretion standard.
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333
Utah law requires consideration of at

least three factors before awarding alimony.

Those factors are:

(1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse;
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient
income;

and (3) the ability of the supporting spouse to provide

support. 7 "
1993) .

Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah App.

Examination of the record in the case at bar demonstrates

that with respect to the issue of alimony the trial court in
reality made conclusions without considering the required factors
or making the required findings which must support an alimony
award.

(R. at 46-56).

A trial court abuses its discretion when

it fails to consider the enumerated factors.
866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah App. 1993).

Willey v. Willey,

On the first issue for

appeal, remand is required for additional findings to determine
whether the award of alimony is factually supported.

Because the

findings are inadequate, marshaling of the evidence is not
3

necessary.

Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477-78 (Utah App.

1991) .
The second issue on appeal considers whether the trial court
erred in granting appellee an equitable interest in plaintiff's
premarital home.

The standard of review is an abuse of

discretion standard.
App. 1987) .

Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah

On this issue the trial court made what were in

effect conclusions of law rather than findings of fact.

(R. at

46-56) .
Under Utah law there is a presumption that ownership of
premarital property remains with the spouse who brought the
property into the marriage.
706 (Utah 1982).

Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705,

Where premarital property is considered as part

of an equitable division of property, 14 factors have been
outlined for consideration by trial court.
P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987).

Burke v. Burke, 733

In the case at bar, the trial court

only considered a few of the fourteen factors.

(R. at 46-56) .

On the issue of contribution by defendant to the appreciation of
plaintiff's home during the marriage, the court found erroneously
based on marshaled evidence.

As in the first issue above, the

findings of fact are not sufficient to support the finding of the
trial court.

On this issue, plaintiff seeks reversal of the

finding regarding contribution to the appreciation of the home,
and remand for consideration of the required factors for awarding
an equitable interest in premarital property.

4

ARGUMENT
I.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE INADEQUATE TO
SUPPORT THE ALIMONY AWARD.
The first issue on appeal is set forth in the docketing

statement as follows:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion

in making an award of alimony?

The standard of review in

considering an award of alimony is an abuse of discretion
standard.

In Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah

App. 1995), the court set forth the standard in the following
manner:
"Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining
alimony . . . and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear
and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated."
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App.), cert,
denied, 817 P. 2d 327 (Utah 1991) . We review a trial court's
conclusion of law with respect to alimony awards for
correctness, according no deference to the trial court. Id.
If, however, we are charged with the task of reviewing the
trial court's findings of fact, we will reverse only if the
findings are clearly erroneous. Id. Breinholt v. Breinholt,
905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995) .
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony
because the findings of fact of the trial court are not adequate
to support the award.

URCP Rule 52 (c) demonstrates the

necessity of adequate factual findings in domestic cases.

The

rule indicates that findings of fact and conclusions of law are
necessary in divorce cases in that they cannot be waived.

In the

case at bar, in effect, the trial court entered conclusions
without the support of specific findings.

The " . . . omission of

particular findings in alimony awards is an abuse of discretion."
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) .

The findings that were entered in the case at bar are
5

inadequate, and do not support the alimony award.
Under Utah law, the "function of alimony is to provide
support for the [receiving spouse] as nearly as possible at the
standard of living [he or] she enjoyed during the marriage, and
to prevent the [receiving spouse] from becoming a public charge."
Jones v. Jones, 700 p.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); (quoting English
v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)).

In attempting to

achieve the goals of an alimony award, the Utah appellate courts
have indicated very specifically the factors which must be
considered and the findings which must be made in making an award
of alimony.

In Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah

App. 1996) , the court stated:
It is well grounded in Utah law that the trial court must
consider: "x (1) the financial conditions and needs of the
receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse
to produce a sufficient income; and (3) the ability of the
supporting spouse to provide support.'" Godfrey v. Godfrey,
854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted). A
trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider
the enumerated factors. Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 550
(Utah App. 1993) . "Thus, xthe trial court must make
sufficiently detailed findings on each factor to enable a
reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's
discretionary determination was rationally based upon'" the
required factors. Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly,
"' [i]f sufficient findings are not made, we must reverse
unless the record is clear and uncontroverted such as would
allow us to apply the factors as a matter of law on
appeal.'" Id. (citation omitted).
In the case at bar, the findings of fact of the trial court
are not adequate to support the alimony award.

Unfortunately,

the record is controverted and the matter will require remand to
make the necessary factual determinations.
6

The findings of fact made by the trial court regarding
alimony are as follows:
5. The Plaintiff is fully capable of supporting himself and
to pay the obligations incurred during the marriage. (R. at
47) .
6. The Defendant is in need of support from the Plaintiff
and the Plaintiff has the ability to pay support based on
his past and current income. Furthermore, the Defendant is
entitled to live at the same standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage now that the parties are divorced. The
court finds that the Defendant's current situation and
standard of living is less than what she enjoyed during the
marriage and the Court awards alimony to the Defendant in
order to more equalize the parties's respective current
financial positions. Based thereon, the Defendant should be
awarded a sum of not less than $500.00 per month as alimony
from Plaintiff, beginning June 1, 1997, and continuing each
month thereafter for a period of four (4) years, or until
Defendant remarries, whichever occurs first. (R. at 47).
(See exhibit I) .
Comparison of the findings of fact made by the trial court
to the requirements set forth in Marshall, make it apparent that
none of the required findings were made by the trial court.
The first alimony related finding is designated as number 5
above.

Finding number 5 concludes that the plaintiff is capable

of supporting himself and paying the obligations of the marriage.
(R. at 47).
This finding is inadequate first, because it is although it
is contained in the findings of fact, it is in reality a
conclusion of law.

In considering findings of fact which are in

reality conclusions of law, appellate courts disregard labels and
look to substance.

Zions First National Bank, N.A. v. National

Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988); Demetropoulos
v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 963 n. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
7

If the

court determines that finding of fact number 5 is in fact a
conclusion of law, it would be reviewed under a correctness
standard.

State Ex Rel. Div. of Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista

Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990) .

Under a correctness review

finding of fact number 5 requires reversal as it is unsupported
by any factual findings.

See Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999

(Utah 1987); Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).
Second, finding of fact number 5 fails to consider or
determine either the plaintiff's financial obligations or his
income.

Third, the finding fails to indicate what obligations of

the marriage plaintiff is capable of paying.

Finally, the

finding fails to consider the ability of the plaintiff to provide
support, or the plaintiff's financial needs.

" [T]he payor

spouse's reasonable needs are a necessary subsidiary step in
determining the ability to provide support."

Willey v. Willev,

866 P.2d 547, 551 & n.l (Utah App. 1993) .
Finding of fact number 6 suffers from the same deficiencies
as finding of fact number 5.

Review of finding of fact number 6

demonstrates that it too is in reality a conclusion of law.

The

first sentence of the finding concludes that defendant needs
support and that Plaintiff can pay based on his past and current
income.

(R. at 47). The conclusions regarding payment and

receipt of support are made without any finding as to the past or
present income of the parties, or their respective needs.

(R. at

47) .
Examination of the findings of fact make it evident that
8

there was no consideration of " . . . the financial conditions and
needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving
spouse to support him or herself."

Willev v. Willey, 866 P. 2d

547, 551 8c n.l (Utah App. 1993).
Finding of fact number 6 also concludes that . . . "the
Defendant's current situation and standard of living is less than
what she enjoyed during the marriage. . . ." ' (R. at 47)

This

finding is deficient because the court has not made findings
regarding the current situation or what the standard of living
was during the marriage.

(R. at 46-56) .

The findings of fact of

the trial court fail as a matter of law to support an award of
alimony.
The comments of this court in Breinholt regarding the effect
of deficient findings of fact apply strongly in the case at bar:
In the case at bar, the trial court made no findings of
defendant's financial needs as required, nor did it make
findings of plaintiff's financial needs. An "underlying
factual determination. . . required for an assessment" of
plaintiff's ability to provide support. Willev, 866 P.2d at
551. Although each party testified regarding their monthly
expenses, the trial court did not enter findings regarding
the reasonableness of the expenses. Based on this failure,
"we remand for findings on each party's reasonable needs so
we can determine if the court abused its discretion in
setting the amount . . . of the alimony award." Id.
Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah App. 1995) .
Because of the inadequacy of the factual findings, the award of
alimony in this matter should be reversed, and the case should be
remanded to the trial court.
II.

A MARSHALING STANDARD DOES NOT APPLY WHERE FACTUAL FINDINGS
ARE CHALLENGED FOR INADEQUACY.
Ordinarily, when an appellant challenges the factual
9

findings of a trial court a marshaling standard applies.
Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 n. 1 (Utah App. 1995) .
When the sufficiency of the findings rather than the findings
themselves are challenged, no marshaling is required.

In

Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477-78 (Utah App. 1991), this
court stated:
There is, in effect, no need for an appellant to marshal the
evidence when the findings are so inadequate that they
cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations.
In other words, the way to attack findings which appear to
be complete and which are sufficiently detailed is to
marshal the supporting evidence and then demonstrate the
evidence is inadequate to sustain such findings. But where
the findings are not of that caliber, appellant need not go
through a futile marshaling exercise. Rather, appellant can
simply argue the legal insufficiency of the court's findings
as framed. As explained in the next section, whatever may
be said of the extent to which the trial court's intended
findings lack evidentiary support, the more immediate
problem in this case is the inadequacy of the findings.
In the case at bar, marshaling the evidence would be futile
because as demonstrated above, the required factual
determinations were never made.
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE
AWARD TO DEFENDANT OF AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IN PLAINTIFF'S
HOME.
The second issue on appeal is set forth in the docketing
statement as follows:

Did the trial court err in granting

appellee an equitable interest in the home?

The standard of

review when considering a trial court's division of property is
an abuse of discretion standard.

This court stated:

"This court

will not disturb the trial court's decision [concerning property
division] unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of
10

discretion."

Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 66 (UtahApp.

1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
The findings of fact which were entered by the trial court
respecting the award to defendant of an equitable interest in
plaintiff's home are as follows:
8 . The Plaintiff should be awarded the home and real
property acquired prior to this marriage relationship as his
sole and exclusive property, subject to the debt thereon,
and hold the Defendant harmless therefrom.
9. The Court finds that the home had a value of $108,000.00
at the beginning of the marriage and that at the time of the
separation of the parties, the home had a value of
$132,000.00 Based thereon, the Court finds that the net
equity in the home accumulated during the marriage amounts
to $24,000.00 of which the Defendant should be awarded onehalf. The Defendant helped make the payments of the home,
make improvements to the home, and over-all participated in
appreciated value of the home and real property during the
marriage.
10. Based on the foregoing, the Defendant should receive an
equitable lien in the home and real property in the amount
of $12,000.00, which represents one-half (1/2) of the equity
acquired during the marriage. Said equity shall be payable
to the Defendant in full on or before June 1, 2000. If
Plaintiff fails to pay Defendant said equity within the
three (3) year period of time, Defendant shall be awarded a
judgment against Plaintiff for any amounts left unpaid and
said judgment shall begin to accrue interest at the
statutory rate beginning June 1, 2 000.
11. The Defendant should be ordered to execute and deliver
a Quit Claim Deed to the plaintiff upon full payment of said
equity.
12. The Defendant should be awarded the home and real
property she has purchased since the date of separation as
her sole and exclusive property, with no interest in the
Plaintiff, subject to the debt thereon and hold the
Plaintiff harmless therefrom. (R. at 48-49) . (See appendix
I) .
The usual presumption in divorce cases is that premarital
property is retained by the party by whom it was brought into the
11

marriage.
As a general rule, however, premarital property is viewed as
separate property, and equity usually requires that "each
party retain the separate property he or she brought into
the marriage," Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P. 2d 421, 424 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990). See also: Walters v. Walters 812 P.2d 64,
67 (Utah App, 1991).
Finding of fact number 8 reaches the proper conclusion which
is that the plaintiff should retain the home which he brought
into the marriage.

(R. at 4 8 ) , Having reached that conclusion,

however, findings 9-12 award the defendant an equitable interest
in plaintiff's home.

(R. at 4 8 ) . This court must therefore

determine whether the record supports the trial court's award of
the equitable interest in premarital property.
In Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987) the court
set forth 14 factors which are to be considered by a trial court
when determining whether assets obtained prior to a marriage
should be considered in an equitable property distribution.
Those factors are: (1) The amount and kind of property to be
divided.

(2)

Whether the property was acquired before or during

the marriage.
of the parties.

(3)

The source of the property.

(5)

The parties standard of living.

parties respective financial conditions.
(8)

The parties earning capacity.

marriage.
divorce.

(10)
(11)

(4)

(9)

The health
(6)

The

(7) The parties needs.
The duration of the

The parties' ages at the time of marriage and of
What the parties gave up by the marriage.

(12)

The relationship the property division has with the amount of
alimony and child support awarded.

(13)

Whether one spouse has

made any contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of
12

the other spouse.

(14)

Whether the assets were accumulated or

enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties.

Burke at 135.

Proper review of the case at bar requires comparison of the
findings of fact dealing with the award of an equitable interest
in plaintiff's home with the factors set forth above.
Examination of the record demonstrates that of the fourteen
factors set forth above, the trial court made findings, or at
least reached conclusions regarding only four of the factors.
They are factors 1, 2, and 3 which consider the kind of property,
when it was acquired, and the source of the property, and factor
9 which is the duration of the marriage.

Factors 13 and 14 also

received some discussion by the trial court, although the
conclusions reached by the court are not supported by the
evidence marshaled below.
The following paragraphs set forth each of the other Burke
factors, and examine what if any consideration they were given by
the trial court.
The fourth factor for consideration under Burke, is the
health of the parties.

Examination of the record makes it

evident that this factor was not considered by the trial court.
(R. at 46-56) . This factor is important because health concerns
are one of the justifications for considering premarital property
in a property distribution.
The fifth factor is the parties standard of living.

In

finding of fact number 6, the trial court concluded that "the
Defendant's current situation and standard of living is less than
13

what she enjoyed during the marriage. . . " (R. at 47). As set
forth under point I above, the trial court in concluded that
defendant's standard of living was "less," at the time of
divorce, but did so without making any findings as to what that
standard of living was for the parties before or during the
marriage.

(R. at 46-56).

A finding regarding standard of living

is critical to an equitable property settlement.
The sixth factor is the parties' respective financial
conditions.

In finding of fact number 5 the court concluded that

plaintiff was "capable of supporting himself and to pay the
obligations incurred during the marriage."

The court further

concluded in finding of fact number 6 that " . . . Plaintiff has
the ability to pay support based on his past and current income."
(R. at 47). These conclusions were reached without any
discussion or findings regarding the incomes of the parties, or
of their obligations.

(R. at 46-56).

In effect there were no

findings on the respective financial conditions of the parties.
The seventh factor considers the needs of the parties.
Presumably this is a consideration of the financial needs of the
parties.

The findings of fact contain no consideration of the

debts of the parties, their obligations, their incomes, or their
ability to meet ongoing financial obligations.

(R. at 46-56).

The eighth factor for consideration is the earning capacity
of the parties.

While there was evidence presented at trial

regarding the earnings of the parties based on tax returns,

(See

exhibits 48, 49, 50 and 54) , the trial court failed to make any
14

findings regarding the incomes of the parties, or their earning
capacity.

(R. at 46-56).

Factor number ten examines the ages of the parties at the
time of marriage and divorce.
the trial court.

This factor was not considered by

(R. at 46-56) .

The eleventh Burke factor is what the parties gave up by the
marriage.
factor.

The trial court made no findings regarding this
(R. at 46-56).

Factor 12 is the relationship the property division has with
the amount of alimony and child support awarded.

Child support

was not a factor in this case as there were no children born of
the union.

(R. at 47) . Examination of the record makes it

evident that the trial court did not consider any relationship
between the substantial alimony which was awarded, and the
distribution of property.

(R. at 46-56) .

The thirteenth factor is whether one spouse has made any
contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of the
other spouse.

The trial court concluded that " . . . Defendant

helped make the payments on the home, make improvements to the
home, and over-all participated in appreciative value of the home
and real property during the marriage."

(R. at 48). This

finding by the trial court suffers from several deficiencies.
The first deficiency is that the finding is in reality a
conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact.

Assuming

arguendo that the statement above constitutes a finding of fact,
the finding is not supported by the evidence.
15

Whenever a factual finding of a trial court is challenged,
the challenger "must marshal all the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
to support the findings in question.11
P.2d 1108, 1109 n. 1 (Utah App. 1995) .

Phillips v. Hatfield, 904
Plaintiff does not

dispute that part of defendant's income was deposited into a
joint checking account from which payments for the home and other
expenses were made.

(R. at 93).

In offset, plaintiff's income

was used to make the payments on defendant'7 s home until it was
sold.

(R. at 94, 169, 170, 204) .

Further, defendant had

approximately $18,375.00 in Zion's First National Bank at the
time of the marriage, yet plaintiff was not awarded any share of
the appreciation of that asset.

(R. at 162, 163).

(R. at 54).

(See trial exhibit 39) .
Plaintiff strongly disputes the finding that defendant
helped "make improvements to the home, and over-all participated
in appreciative value of the home and real property during the
marriage."

(R. at 48).

The only evidence regarding defendant's

participation in contributing to any appreciation of the home
came by way of Defendant's exhibit number 12.

(See appendix II) .

The marshaled evidence therefore consists of exhibit 12.
Defendant testified that exhibit 12 demonstrates the improvements
to the home during the marriage.

(R. at 135) .

Defendant

testified that improvements totaling $12,500.00 were made to the
home during the marriage.

(R. at 135). Defendant did not offer

specific testimony or evidence as to how the $12,500.00 figure
16

was reached.
Plaintiff testified specifically about the improvements set
forth on exhibit 12, and offered supporting exhibits.
178-180).

(R. at

Defendant's exhibit number 12 indicated that the cost

of running natural gas to the home was $3,000.00.

Plaintiff's

testimony which was supported by exhibit 55 (an invoice from the
gas company)(See appendix III), demonstrates that there was no
charge for connecting plaintiff's home to the natural gas
distribution system.
pipe.

The exhibit only shows a minimal charge for

(R. at 178).

Defendant's exhibit number 12 lists a

cost of $2,000.00 for installation of a gas fireplace.

Plaintiff

testified that he received the fireplace on a work trade for
$700.00, and that no money was actually paid.

(R. at 179) .

The

fireplace was obtained and installed entirely based on
plaintiff s efforts.
Defendant's exhibit 12 claimed that $3,000.00 was paid for
landscaping on the home.

Plaintiff testified that the

landscaping consisted of installation of gravel driveways and
concrete curb.

The invoices for the gravel and concrete are

plaintiff's exhibit 57.

(See appendix IV).

Plaintiff's

testimony, supported by^exhibit 57 was that the gravel driveway
and concrete curb cost approximately $700.00. (R. at 179).
The china cabinet described on exhibit 12 should not be
considered a home improvement, as it was an item of personal
property listed on Plaintiff's exhibit 4.
appendix V ) .

(R. at 38-39).

(See

The china cabinet was awarded to plaintiff by the
17

trial court as part of the distribution of personal property.
(R. at 50).

(See exhibit I ) .

Examination of the evidence regarding defendant's
contribution to the appreciated value of the home demonstrates
that her evidence regarding value is not credible, and that her
participation in the appreciated value of the home was negligible
or non-existent.

The marshaled evidence consists entirely of

exhibit 12, which is not supported when compared to the direct
supported evidence offered by plaintiff.

'The trial court's

finding about defendant's contribution to the appreciated value
of the home must be reversed.
There is no evidence in the record indicating that any of
the improvements in which defendant claims to have participated,
or the payments which she claims to have made, increased the
value of the home as found by the trial court.

In many ways the

case at bar is similar to Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah
1987) .

In Burke a husband was seeking a share of the

appreciation in value of assets which the wife received as part
of her inheritance.

Husband's claim was denied.

The court

considered the above factors and determined that the appreciation
occurred because of changes in land values rather than from a
contribution from husband:
. . . Furthermore, except for having urged the plaintiff to
take her inheritance in land rather than in cash, defendant
concedes that he made no contribution toward the increase in
value of the acreage in question and that the income came
solely from the effects of inflation on land values. Burke,
at 135.
The only evidence regarding a reason for an increase in the
18

valuation of plaintiff's home was given by Joseph Stott,
Plaintiff's appraiser.

Mr. Stott testified about a general

increase in land values in Sevier County which occurred during
the parties' marriage.

(R. at 103).

The final factor for consideration of distribution of
premarital assets under Burke, is whether the assets were
accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties.

In

the case at bar, it is evident that the home was built by the
efforts of plaintiff.

(R. at 4 8 ) . As set forth above, any

increase in the value of the home during the time of the marriage
occurred because of a general increase in property values and not
due to any efforts or contributions of the defendant.
Upon careful analysis it is obvious that the findings of the
trial court are inadequate to support the award of an equitable
interest in plaintiff's home to defendant.

Further, the finding

regarding defendant's contribution to the appreciation of the
home is not supported by the marshaled evidence.

This court's

statement in Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1991) is
particularly applicable to this case:
Before a trial court can include either of the parties'
premarital property in the marital estate, it must find
unique circumstances that warrant disregarding the general
rule that premarital property is separate property. See
Burke, 733 P.2d at 135/ Haumont, 793 P.2d at 424-425. Those
findings must be sufficiently detailed to show how the court
distributed the parties' property. Marchant, 743 P. 2d at
202-03. In the case at bar, the only relevant unique
circumstance discussed by the trial court was the fact that
Helen Walters helped arrange for and make improvements to
Parcels 1 and 2. The court did not consider any of the
other factors generally considered by courts when equitably
distributing property pursuant to a divorce, see Burke, 733
P.2d at 135, Haumont, 793 P.2d at 425. Further, the
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findings are insufficiently detailed to indicate how the
trial court arrived at its decision.
The trial court in the case at bar did not make adequate findings
to support the award of an equitable interest in defendant's
property.

Further, the finding regarding defendant's

contribution to the appreciation of plaintiff's home is not
supported by the evidence.

This issue must therefore be remanded

for further findings consistent with the evidence.
CONCLUSION
Utah law is very specific regarding the findings which must
be made to support an award of alimony.

In the case at bar, the

alimony award is not supported by findings, but is instead based
on a series of conclusions which leave this court without the
ability to review the alimony award.

Because the findings are

inadequate, the usual marshaling standard does not apply.

Based

on the inadequacy of the findings, the order awarding alimony
must be reversed and remanded for a determination which considers
the necessary factors.
Utah law presumes that premarital property remains with the
party bringing the property into the marriage.

When a trial

court considers premarital property as part of an equitable
distribution of property in a divorce case, there are 14 factors
which should be considered by the trial court.

In the case at

bar, the court ignored the majority of the factors, and again
simply set forth a series of conclusions.

On the issue of

contribution to the appreciation of the premarital asset the
trial court did make a finding, but it is not supported by the
20

marshaled evidence.

This finding should be reversed as not

supported by the evidence.

The balance of the findings must be

remanded because the trial court failed to consider the required
factors in awarding an equitable interest in plaintiff's
premarital property.
On review, it is evident that the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding defendant alimony, and awarding an
equitable interest in plaintiff's home.

Plaintiff respectfully

requests that the court reverse this matter and remand it for
further findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with
those findings.

Plaintiff further requests that the court issue

instructions to the trial court indicating that:
We do not intend our remand to be merely an exercise in
bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached."
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah App. 1990). In
fleshing out findings of fact, the trial court may find that
it reaches a different conclusion on remand. Roberts v.
Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 199 (Utah App. 1992).
DATED this ^ /

day of January, 1998.
FISHER, SCRIBNER & STIRLAND, P.C.
• ?

BY: ^^yu*M*£

<L ^fj^^*&^<z~

Darwin C. F i s h » ^
Donald E. McCandless
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l a n t
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January, 1998:
Douglas L. Neeley
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Donald E. McCart&less
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DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290
Attorney for Defendant
320 South 50 West 101-6
Ephraim, Utah 84627
Telephone: (801)283-5055
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DENNIS DAVIS
Plaintiff,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

vs.

:

Civil No. 964600100

MONICA DAVIS

:

JUDGE LOUIS G. TERVORT

Defendant.

:

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 14th and 19th day of May, 1997, before
the Honorable Louis G. Tervort. Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by his attorney,
Paul R. Frischknecht. Defendant appeared in person and was represented by her attorney, Douglas
L. Neeley. The Court, having considered the pleadings, having heard sworn testimony, and being
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Both Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide residents of Sevier County, State of Utah, and
have been for three months immediately prior to filing of this action.

Davis v Davis
Civil No. 964600100
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Page 2
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on July 16, 1992, in the City of Manti, County of
Sanpete, State of Utah, and are presently married.
3. During the course of the marriage, the parties have experienced irreconcilable differences
that have prevented the parties from pursuing a viable marriage relationship. Based thereon, it is
reasonable and proper that the parties be granted a divorce one from the other.
4. No children have been born as issue of this marriage and no children are expected.
5. The Plaintiff is fully capable of supporting himself and to pay the obligations incurred
during the marriage.
6. The Defendant is in need of support from the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff has the ability to
pay support based on his past and current income. Furthermore, the Defendant is entitled to live at
the same standard of living enjoyed during the marriage now that the parties are divorced. The Court
finds that the Defendant's current situation and standard of living is less than what she enjoyed
during the marriage and the Court awards alimony to the Defendant in order to more equalize the
parties' respective current financial positions. Based thereon, the Defendant should be awarded a
sum of not less than $500.00 per month as alimony from Plaintiff, beginning June 1, 1997, and
continuing each month thereafter for a period of four (4) years, or until Defendant remarries,
whichever occurs first.

Davis v Davis
Civil No. 964600100
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Page 3
7. In reference to the issues brought before the Court regarding the parties' respective
financial contributions to this marriage, the Court finds that the parties lived together, pooled their
monies which money was spent by each party for marital purposes and from which each was
benefitted. The Court cannot find from the evidence presented that either party was able to upsurp
funds from the pool and use those funds for some unworthy purpose or in an attempt to hide the
funds. Each party made significant contributions to the marriage and each contributed to the
financial stability of the marriage.
8. The Plaintiff should be awarded the home and real property acquired prior to this marriage
relationship as his sole and exclusive property, subject to the debt thereon and hold the Defendant
harmless therefrom.
9. The Court finds that the home had a value of $108,000 at the beginning of the marriage
and that at the time of the separation of the parties, the home had a value of $132,000. Based
thereon, the Court finds that the net equity in the home accumulated during the marriage amounts
to $24,000 of which the Defendant should be awarded one-half (14). The Defendant helped make
the payments on the home, make improvements to the home, and over-all participated in appreciative
value of the home and real property during the marriage.

Davis v Davis
Civil No. 964600100
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Page 4
10. Based on the foregoing, the Defendant should receive an equitable lien in the home and
real property in the amount of $12,000, which represents one-half QA) of the equity acquired during
the marriage. Said equity shall be payable to the Defendant over a period of three (3) years and shall
carry no interest. Said equity shall be paid to the Defendant in full on or before June 1, 2000. If
Plaintiff fails to pay Defendant said equity within the three (3) year period of time, Defendant shall
be awarded a judgment against Plaintiff for any amounts left unpaid and said judgment shall begin
to accrue interest at the statutory rate beginning June 1, 2000.
11. The Defendant should be ordered to execute and deliver a Quit Claim Deed to the
Plaintiff upon full payment of said equity.
12. The Defendant should be awarded the home and real property she has purchased since
the date of separation as her sole and exclusive property, with no interest in the Plaintiff, subject to
the debt thereon and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
13. During the course of the marriage relationship, the parties acquired personal property.
The Plaintiff should be awarded the following personal property as his sole and exclusive property:
A. To the Plaintiff from Plaintiffs Exhibit #3 that he has marked. If the Defendant
has them in her possession, she is to return them forthwith:
1. Caller ID

Davis v Davis
Civil No. 964600100
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Page 5
2. Yellow Quilt
3. Coolers (Rob, Shan, Dennis)
4. Quinn's Games and Nintendo
5. Keys for Safe Deposit
6. Portable Electric Heater
7. Super Nintendo Plug
8. Tow Ropes
9. Extension Cords
10. Fishing Gear
B. Plaintiff is awarded the following items from Plaintiffs Exhibit #4:
1. 1995 4-Wheeler
2. China Cabinet
3. 1992 Plymouth Acclaim
4. Velvet Blue Chair
5. Tiller

Davis v Davis
Civil No. 964600100
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Page 6
C. Plaintiff is awarded the following itemsfromDefendant's Exhibit #9 not awarded
to the Defendant:
1. LawnEdger
2. Snow Plow
3. Pistol
4. Dishwasher
5. One (1) Recliner
6. Food Storage
7. Kirby Vacuum
8. Pictures & Knicknacks
9. Big Screen TV
10. Camcorder
14. During the course of the marriage relationship, the parties acquired personal property.
The Defendant should be awarded the following personal property as her sole and exclusive
property:
A. To the Defendant from Plaintiffs Exhibit #3 and from Defendant's Exhibit #9:
1. 1996 GMC Truck

Davis v Davis
Civil No. 964600100
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Page 7

2. Ring
3. Computer
4. Health Rider
5. Bar Stools
6. Headboard
7. Washer, Dryer, & Refrigerator
8. Dirt Devil Vacuum
9. Ice Cream Maker
10. Green Chairs
11. Yard Decorations
12. One(l)Recliner
13. Dish ware
14. Yard Tools
15. Trailer Hitch
16. Christmas Decorations

Davis v Davis
Civil No. 964600100
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Page 8
B. Defendant should be awarded her pre-marital propertyfromDefendant's Exhibit
#10. If the Plaintiff has them in his possession, he is to return them forthwith.
1. Smith Corona Typewriter, Type Ribbons and Correction Ribbon
2. Vacuum Accessories
3. Two (2) Guitar Stands
4. Pistol (acquired prior to marriage)
5. Pictures (including granddaughter's blessing pictures)
6. Christmas Tree Stand
7. Wood Stand
8. Kitchen Items
9. Games (Rummy Cube, Sorry and Clue)
10. Country Western Tapes Marked with MD
11. Gold Chain Necklace
12. Flashlight
13. Tools
14. Hummel Figurine
15. Lawn Spreader

Davis v Davis
Civil No. 964600100
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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16. Easter Decorations
17. Life Jackets
18. Kitchen plates & decorations
19. Silver Chain
20. Two (2) Crock Pots
21. Yardsticks
22. Orange Extension Cord
23. Wreath in Bathroom
24. Bath Towels, Sheets, & Pillow Cases
C. The parties should be ordered to return any items listed that they may have in their
possession that is awarded to the other party.
15. Each party should be awarded, as their sole and exclusive property, any and all
outstanding bank accounts, certificate of deposits, savings accounts, annuities and/or any other
accounts that bear their separate names.
16. It is fair and reasonable that the parties should each be ordered to assume and pay, and
hold the other harmlessfromliability on, all separate debts and obligations incurred by them since
the date of separation, June 6? 1996.

Davis v Davis
Civil No. 964600100
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Page 10
17. The Courtfindsthat the household bills incurred prior to the parties' separation and paid
by the Plaintiff should be off-set against the monies taken from the Defendant's savings account by
the Credit Union and applied towards the truck payments during the three (3) months that the
Plaintiff had the use and possession of the 1996 GMC truck.
18. Each party should be awarded their respective insurance policies as their sole and
exclusive property including any and all cash values therein.
19. Each party should be awarded their own retirement and/or profit sharing plans through
their respective employment or otherwise.
20. Each party should be ordered to assume his/her own costs and attorney's fees incurred
in prosecuting this action.
21. It is reasonable and proper that the Defendant be restored the use of her former name,
Durfee.
22. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are
required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
23. Should either party fail to abide by the provisions of a Decree of Divorce issued herein,
that party should be liable for indemnification of the other, including attorney's fees and Court costs
incurred in the enforcement of the Decree of Divorce.

Davis v Davis
Civil No. 964600100
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Page 11
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties in the above-entitled matter, and the parties
are entitled to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
2. The parties should be awarded a Decree of Divorce, to become absolute and final upon
entry by the Court herein.
3. The Court concludes that all other issues of dispute have been resolved by the Court
pursuant to the above Findings of Fact.
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DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290
Attorney for Defendant
320 South 50 West 101-6
Ephraim, Utah 84627
Telephone: (801)283-5055
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS DAVIS
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

Civil No. 964600100

MONICA DAVIS

:

JUDGE LOUIS G. TERVORT

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 14th and 19th day of May, 1997, before
the Honorable Louis G. Tervort. Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by his attorney,
Paul R. Frischknecht. Defendant appeared in person and was represented by her attorney, Douglas
L. Neeley. The Court, having considered the pleadings, having heard sworn testimony, and being
otherwise fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE THAT:
1. The bonds of matrimony and the marriage contract heretofore existing by and between
the Plaintiff and Defendant be, and the same are hereby dissolved, and the parties are hereby awarded

Davis v Davis
Civil No. 964600100
Decree of Divorce
Page 2
a Decree of Divorce from each other, said Decree to become absolute and final upon entry by the
Court herein.
2. The Defendant is awarded a sum of not less than $500.00 per month as alimony from
Plaintiff, beginning June 1,1997, and continuing each month thereafter for a period of four (4) years,
or until Defendant remarries, whichever occurs first.
3. The Plaintiff is awarded the home and real property acquired prior to this marriage
relationship as his sole and exclusive property, subject to the debt thereon and hold the Defendant
harmless therefrom.
4. The Defendant is awarded an equitable lien in the home and real property in the amount
of $12,000, which represents one-half (Vi) of the equity acquired during the marriage. Said equity
shall be payable to the Defendant over a period of three (3) years and shall carry no interest. Said
equity shall be paid to the Defendant in full on or before June 1, 2000. If Plaintiff fails to pay
Defendant said equity within the three (3) year period of time, Defendant shall be awarded a
judgment against Plaintiff for any amounts left unpaid and said judgment shall begin to accrue
interest at the statutory rate beginning June 1, 2000.
5. The Defendant is ordered to execute and deliver a Quit Claim Deed to the Plaintiff upon
full payment of said equity.

Davis v Davis
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6. The Defendant is awarded the home and real property she has purchased since the date
of separation as her sole and exclusive property, with no interest in the Plaintiff, subject to the debt
thereon and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
7. The Plaintiff is awarded the following personal property as his sole and exclusive
property:
A. To the Plaintiff from Plaintiffs Exhibit #3 that he has marked. If the Defendant
has them in her possession, she is to return them forthwith:
1. Caller ID
2. Yellow Quilt
3. Coolers (Rob, Shan, Dennis)
4. Quinn's Games and Nintendo
5. Keys for Safe Deposit
6. Portable Electric Heater
7. Super Nintendo Plug
8. Tow Ropes
9. Extension Cords
10. Fishing Gear

Davis v Davis
Civil No. 964600100
Decree of Divorce
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B. Plaintiff is awarded the following items from Plaintiffs Exhibit #4:
1. 1995 4-Wheeler
2. China Cabinet
3. 1992 Plymouth Acclaim
4. Velvet Blue Chair
5. Tiller
C. Plaintiff is awarded the following items from Defendant's Exhibit #9 not awarded
to the Defendant:
1. LawnEdger
2. Snow Plow
3. Pistol
4. Dishwasher
5. One (l)Recliner
6. Food Storage
7. Kirby Vacuum
8. Pictures & Knicknacks
9. Big Screen TV

Davis v Davis
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Decree of Divorce
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10. Camcorder
8. The Defendant is awarded the following personal property as her sole and exclusive
property:
A. To the Defendant from Plaintiffs Exhibit #3 and from Defendant's Exhibit #9:
1. 1996 GMC Truck
2. Ring
3. Computer
4. Health Rider
5. Bar Stools
6. Headboard
7. Washer, Dryer, & Refrigerator
8. Dirt Devil Vacuum
9. Ice Cream Maker
10. Green Chairs
11. Yard Decorations
12. One(l)Recliner
13. Dishware

Davis v Davis
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14. Yard Tools
15. Trailer Hitch
16. Christmas Decorations
B. Defendant is awarded her pre-marital property from Defendant's Exhibit #10. If
the Plaintiff has them in his possession, he is to return them forthwith.
1. Smith Corona Typewriter, Type Ribbons and Correction Ribbon
2. Vacuum Accessories
3. Two (2) Guitar Stands
4. Pistol (acquired prior to marriage)
5. Pictures (including granddaughter's blessing pictures)
6. Christmas Tree Stand
7. Wood Stand
8. Kitchen Items
9. Games (Rummy Cube, Sony and Clue)
10. Country Western Tapes Marked with MD
11. Gold Chain Necklace
12. Flashlight

Davis v Davis
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Decree of Divorce
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13. Tools
14. Hummel Figurine
15. Lawn Spreader
16. Easter Decorations
17. Life Jackets
18. Kitchen plates & decorations
19. Silver Chain
20. Two (2) Crock Pots
21. Yardsticks
22. Orange Extension Cord
23. Wreath in Bathroom
24. Bath Towels, Sheets, & Pillow Cases
C. The parties are ordered to return any items listed that they may have in their
possession that is awarded to the other party.
9. Each party is awarded, as their sole and exclusive property, any and all outstanding bank
accounts, certificate of deposits, savings accounts, annuities and/or any other accounts that bear their
separate names.

Davis v Davis
Civil No. 964600100
Decree of Divorce
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10. The parties are each ordered to assume and pay, and hold the other harmless from
liability on, all separate debts and obligations incurred by them since the date of separation, June 6,
1996.
11. Each party is awarded their respective insurance policies as their sole and exclusive
property including any and all cash values therein.
12. Each party is awarded their ov/n retirement and/or profit sharing plans through their
respective employment or otherwise.
13. Each party is ordered to assume his/her own costs and attorney's fees incurred in
prosecuting this action.
14. Defendant is restored the use of her former name, Durfee.
15. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are required
to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
16. Should either party fail to abide by the provisions of a Decree of Divorce issued herein,
that party will be liable for indemnification of the other, including attorney's fees and Court costs
incurred in the enforcement of the Decree of Divorce.

Davis v Davis
Civil No. 964600100
Decree of Divorce
Page 9
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APPENDIX I I

EXHIBIT
DEFENDANT'S CONTRIBUTION TO MARITAL HOME
Total House Payments made: August 1992 through June 6, 1996
47 months @ $l,206.84/mo = $56,721.48
Improvements Made to Home During Marriage
Improvement

Approximate Cost

Installed gas line into home
Installed built-in china cabinet
Installed gas fireplace
Fixed hot-tub
Replaced garage door opener
Landscaped yard
Wallpaperd rooms
Installed smoke alarms
Installed shower door
Installed lights and mirror

$3,000
2,000
2,000
225
350
3,000
700
750
200
300
$12,525

TOTAL PAYMENTS ON HOME MORTGAGE & IMPROVEMENTS

$69,246.48

APPENDIX III

CERTIFICATION NUMBERS
Sl/BLDG NO

CUST_TYPE

SERVICE LINE
APPLICATION
AND AGREEMENT
• MOUNTAIN FUEL

Q
D
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FIRST NAME
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7
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PROJECT NO
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O W N E R AND CLEARANCE CONTACT INFORMATION

A P P U C A N T AND SERVICE LOCATION INFORMATION
LAST NAME

MWO

Q*T4«sid«ntia!
• Commercial
D Lg. Comm
O Non-r*sid
D Industnal

FIRST NAME

LAST NAME

PHONE NO

Pa/ ?
AODRESS

ADDRESS

SUBDIVISION

STATE

LOT NO

CITY

ZIPCOOE

CONTACT FOR CLEARANCE

-

ZPCOOE

/ s
CrTYOPiCOUNTf

STATE^

/

ZIP COOE'

CITY

MAILING ADDRESS

MAP

SKETCH AND
METER SET
INFORMATION

LENGTH
DCity
D County
aStat*Hwy
ONon*

LTlHP

DHP
DLP

^Cr^jLyp5o

: * * V ^

DIAMETER

v:
PRIORITY
D-FInish*d
D Framing

O Drywall
O Foundation

'-An

#

i

NORTH

fj*M-

S"?

>A!./„HV«
"t T*r

^r

IiL

$

IU/

METER SET DATE
MULTI-FAMILY

No of Units
STATUS CODE
D Not Contractabl*
D Yes

D No
O Not Horn*

CONSUMPTION
CF.DAY

CONNECTED EQUIP
DESCRIPTION

7*>orA,x+

NOOE

TYPE
ET*Plast»c
O Steel

OTHER/EXISTING APPLIANCES E LP W C O S
HEATING Pnmafv tL Secondary
tL/S
Wtr HT
& Rano* £~
OtyrJgZ
Oth*r Applrahc*
Fuel

Drus.

V

ORIGL INSTALL DATE

S E R V I C E SPECIFICATIONS

PRESSURE

LTPIastic
D Steel

ff^A^ */V

/?=V

PERMIT

^

• Twin
D Short Side
D-Long Side
• Stub Completion

AREA

RAX

ZONE

/<?--,?
MAIN INFORMATION

PHONE NO

JL

.vicFnreiW

M.
J^±

TOTAL EXISTING (E)
TOTAL NEW (N) or
TOTAL AOOfTldNAL (A)

'30

TOTAL CONSUMPTION
METER RISER
H LOCATION
LOCATION

. ,

/

£>rhAir ( fa f

METER SET

PAD DIMENSIONS

METER PAD

1 PRECONSTRUCTION CHARGES

SIZE FOOTAGE

1 Service Une
| Excess Footage
| Service Une Change
|_ Excess Costs

]
A
/*

p PAYMENT TERMS
O Cash
D N*t 30 days
a Check O Customer P 0 #

/

ETtfot Required
Q By Applicant
D Bv MFS

OMoTBoquirad
• By Applicant
O Bv MFS

—

/

fta/Q

METER PROTECTION

Qlnsid*
QdOtsid*

/

"Ah
AMOUNT

COST/FT

-^^_ -

9/
* /

4 ^

" Yfasp tf(*J? "

RECEIPT #

Custonier willing to negotiate excess charge for frost •

h <^f,jJg<^TC^F^OJBigjfetlS^Ot>lER

BOMBBSM]

F^MPAft|gC|Bfg

A

Yes/Jy

Q No

a<#ft#Mfa

Applicant agrees to pay to Mountain Fuel Supply Company the"amount shown above as "Preconstruction Charged" and further agrees to use natural gas forihe purposes fisted in the J*
connected equipment descnption at the above addres? within jwo (2> years fronithrdate otiflsiajjation of the service line or to pay the^oropeny $
/ri^LJ
per foot for a distance
teet
wnic
°f
tff
" totals % « 7 ^ % ? ^ f > ^ ~ plus
rfr*'fi
% annual interest the Company's authorized pn tax rate of return Interest accrues from the date
of completion* of faalrties f Distance" means^he length of pipe installed from the Company s main to the meter nser location^. Customer will also pay any legal costs, including Attorney
fees and collection costs incurred in collecting unpaid default amounts In addition to Mountain Fuel's Rules and Regulations wfrich-a» on file and have been approved by the Pubfc
Service Commission of the State in which this service is rendered THE CONDITIONS, AGREEMENTS, AND PREREQUtSTTES ON THEREVERSE SIDE ARE A PART OF THE
CONTRACT. THIS CONTRACT SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE ONLY AFTER ACCEPTANCE BY MOUNTAIN FUEL AND DEPOSIT OF AN EXECUTED COPY IN THE UNTOD
STATES MAIL ADDRESSED TO APPLICANT AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS

(Jr.

AGREED

Applicant

ACCEPTED

Mountain Fuel Supply Bv X

By.

^J^c^fiC

'

ihL

Title

~ /

Title !<V / ^ / / y , / g/^9srj~S„<^
VK

Date
in^-Oatt

x ii: J /

~-

^/-r-f?
FORM 123 (3 92)

APPENDIX

IV

CUSTOMER COPY

mm PBDDmns

READY MIX CONCRETE
ASPHALT PAVING

350 East 4 0 0 North

BATCH PLANT LOCATIONS:
<Aurora
-^529-7496
MTPIeasant - 462-2058
Manti - 835-4331
Centerfield - 528-7279
Huntington - 687-9807

NO. 12920

Centerfield, Utah 8 4 6 2 2
* ^

SOLD TO

MAILING
ADDRESS
SPECIAL
INSTRUCTIONS
DELIVERY
ADDRESS

x

f>.^\

^

DATE .
CUST
ORDER NO
TOT CU YDS

—r—

<>£

CEMENT
BAGS MIX

/GC M

CEMENT
TYPE

£ t « ' h i ic (c l

LOT
NO
% OF ASTM
AEA

WATER
PER YD
PR

AREAS

UNIT PRICE

QUANTITY

v; 0,0

t He-

l^fC^-<.

v^a

L r» *v^<J

TOTAL

^th^'-^i

I^.Cd

-y""<Tic-<-l

JK

Sd
<^P ~

-*+ <?.C'Z''
- J

<rJ

tf^" 5 " / J

A / F 6 :b > ?7^7:
LATE HOUR DELIVERY CHARGE
DRAYAGE

REASON FOR EXCESSIVE
UNLOADING CHARGE
FINISH LOAD •

EXCESSIVE UNLOADING CHARGE

WHEELBARROW •

TOPPING BASEMENT •

PART LOAD
DELIVERY CHARGE

CRANE JOB D

BOND BEAM

•

SUB-TOTAL

J

BROKEN FORM Q

CUSTOMER DELAY IN PLACEMENT •
SEE REVERSE SICE D
30 minutes free unloading time up to and including 6 cubic yards On orders s^er
6 yards an additional 5 minutes per yard will be allowed

Our drivers will make every effort to
place matenal where Customer designates but the Company
assumes no responsibility for damages inside curb or property
line Customo^asges to terms of sale and delivery and
Due to important factors which are out
lehvery, this Company will not accept
Jished results
•turned concrete
pntrained unless otherwise specified

STATE TAX
TOTAL
AMOUNT

IMPORTANT: Additional water
added to this concrete will reduce
its strength. Any water added is
at customer's own risk.
WATER ACOED ON JOB
AT CUSTOMER S REQUEST
TRUCK

ESTIMATED
SLUMP

Gal
DRIVER
L{jL'<~C.

THIS CONCRETE IS USED FOR
•oilcving date of purchase In the event
da/s after due date I or we agree to pay
it or otherwise a reasonable attorney s fee
[of 2% per month (ANNUAL PERCENTAGE
ive ail ngnts to claim exemption under state
agent constitutes acceptance of the above
YAND
v
EEDTO A
-

FOOT.NG •

WALL Q

FOUNDATION •

FORMS •

STE=S •
SIDEWALK D

FLOOR

•

DRIVEWAY

D

OTHER

D

PATIO •
CURB & GUTTER D

OWNER OR AGENT

D

AURORA 529*7496
MT. PLEASANT 462-2058
MANTI 835-4331
HUNTINGTON 687-9132

CENTERFIELD, UTAH~84e:
(801) 528-7279

READY-MIX CONCRE' 7

ASPHALT-SAND AND GRAVEL

s
o

r

L
D

\ INVD^CH NO.)

DENNIS DAVIS
2 3 3 £ A S T 7 0 0 NORTH
R I O - F I E L D J UT 8«*70i

DATE

\ CUSTOMER HO \

LOCATOR

I
H*S065

a. u—
i

_J

L_

PURCHASE ORDER.
JOB
ADDRESS.

DATE
v— •»

^ - H H

JOB NUMBER

DESCRIPTION

TICKET

22611

600

\

QUANTITY

PRICE

55*000

CEMENT

T

DISCOUNT ALLOWED • IF PAID ON OR BY

ALL ACCOUNTS ARE DUE ON THE 15th OF THE FOLLOWING MONTH IN
WHICH THE SALE WAS MADE A FINANCE CHARGE OF V/2% PER MONTH (ANNUAL RATE OF 18°o) WILL
BE CHARGED ON ALL PAST DUE ACCOUNTS IF COLLECTION IS MADE BY SUIT OR OTHERWISE, INTEREST WILL SE CHARGED UNTIL PAID ALSO COLLECTION COSTS AND ATTORNEY S FEES
CUSTOMS?. ZZ- {

-

SUB TOTAL
SALES TAX
AMOUNT DUE

AMOUNT
19:

BAFGW PLANT LOCATIONS:
<Auj£raJ- 529-7496

STATEMENT COPY
Y MIX CONCRETE
ASPHALT PAVING

350 East 400 North
Centerfield, Utah 84622
SOLD TO

Mt Pleasant - 462-2058
Manti835-4331
- Centerfield - 528-7279
Huntington - 687-9807

NO.

VJ <*/-<^q\

S<ir^5rn

Q^v/Avjis

22611

DATE
CUST
ORDER NO. .

^yvvAS

MAILING
ADDRESS

171

TOT C U Y D S

SPECIAL
INSTRUCTIONS

AD^RVISRSY
CEMENT
BAGS MIX

3 7*
/

E

w

AREAS

N,

£^f.c\A

1~V

TYPE

WATER
PER YD

•s-J'

Q

PR

v/7v?o 1

i UNIT PRICE 1

O
~

\Lc\&"\
^1^3

\

TOTAL

L<fGv^t

\C^*&
^

^
%OFASTM
ABA

<"
\ ->

[ QUANTITY

Psrrxxs-t

O^oo^

^ o

CEMENT

M

1

(3

:

17

r

5T^4

r c ^r^"hw

LATE HOUR DELIVERY CHARGE
DRAYAttF
UMAYA^t
REASON FOR EXCESSIVE
UNLOADING CHARGE
FINISH LOAD •
TOPPING BASEMENT Q

L0AD

DELIVERY CHARGE

EXCESSIVE UNLOADING CHARGE

WHEELBARROW D
CRANE I O R

CUSTOMER DELAY IN PLACEMENT •

PART

BOND BEAM
PI

•

SUB-TOTAL

nnnk-cw P O P M 1 1

SEE REVERSE SIDE

•

30 minutes free unloading time up to and including 6 cubic yards On orders over
6 yards an additional 5 minutes per yard will be allowed

Our drivers will make every effort to
place matenal where Customer designates but the Company
assumes no responsibility tor damages inside- curb or property
line Customer agrees to terms of sale and delivery and
accepts concrete as is Due to important factors which are out
of our control after delivery, this Company will not accept
responsibility for the finished results
No credit allowed for returned concrete
Ail concrete air entrained unless otherwise specified
CONDITION O F S A L E :
All accounts due 15th of month following date of purchase In the event
payment is not made within 30 days after aue date I or jve agree to pay
if collection is made by suit or otherwise a reasonable attorney s fee
plus a FINANCE CHARGE of 2% per rronth (ANNUAL PERCENTAGE
RATE 24%) and hereby waive all nghts to Cairn exemption under statf
laws Signature by owner or agent constitutes acfe/tayceyDf jjje abov/

RECEIVED BY AND yj
TERMS AGREED TO A

STATE TAX,
TOTAL
AMOUNT:

IMPORTANT: Additional water
added to this concrete will reduce
its strength. Any water added is
at customer's own risk.

ESTIMATED
SLUMP

WATER ADDED CN JOB
AT CUSTOMED S REQUEST
TRUCK

Gal.
D

37

v

£> o !£L.

THIS CONCRETE IS USED FOR
FOOTING D
WALL •
FLOOR
FOUNDATION •
FORMS • DRIVEWAY
STEPS •
PATIO •
(SlbEWALK D CURB & GUTTER D
OTHER

\U^"

OWNER OR AGENT

•
•
•
D

BATCH LOCATIONS
AURORA 529^7496
'
MT rt£A§ANT 462-2058
MANTI 835-4331
HUNTINGTON 687-9132

CENTERFIELD, UTAH 84622
(801) 528-7279

READY-MIX CONCRETE

ASPHALT-SAND AND GRAVEL

~1

S
O
L
D

CENNIS DA*-IS
2 3 8 EAST 700 NOPTH
RICHFIELD* UT S4-701

DATE

INVOICENO

4-7090

| CUSTOMER NO

S-2C-93

3i£i

LOCATION

i l

1

_J

L_

PURCHASE ORDER.
JOB
ADDRESS.

DATE

3-??-?3

JOB NUMBER

DESCRIPTION

TICKET

6 0 !>

QUANTITY

PRICE

CEMEN"1

DISCOUNT ALLOWED • IF PAID ON OR BY

ALL ACCOUNTS ARE DUE ON THE 15th OF THE FOLLOWING MONTH IN
WHICH THE SALE WAS MADE A FINANCE CHARGE OF 1Vo PER MONTH (ANNUAL RATE OF 18%) WILL
BE CHARGED CN ALL PAST DUE ACCOUNTS IF COLLECTION IS MADE BY SUIT OR OTHERWISE INTEREoT Wk_L RE C-iARGED UNTIL PAID ALSO COLLECTION COSTS. ^ND A H P ^ N ^ Y S FEES

SUB TOTAL
SALES TAX
AMOUNT DUE

AMOUNT

^BATCH PLANT LOCATIONS:

RQCK PRODUCTS
350 East 400 North
Centerfield, Utah 84622

SOLDTO ± > e V M (

fe

READY MIX
ASPHALT

L_Aurora>
529-7496
Teasant - 462-2058
\Mt
Hieas
Manti - 835-4331
Centerfield-528-7279
Huntington - 687-9807

CONCRETE
PAVING

No. 32337
5T-3'-77

O^V/ S

DATE _
CUST
ORDER NO _

MAILING
ADDRESS
SPECIAL
INSTRUCTIONS

TOT CIJ YDS

^im^fE.
CEMENT
BAGS MIX

N°OT

?oo/^t H^utetiM.
CEMENT

/ I
CP

TYPE

/

/

"

%OFASTM T } t

WATER
PER YD

^LM-

AEA
PR

QUANTITY

AREAS

$.oS~

/jmv*.

XT

3'/*y& 6b^{v*is.

OC \

UNIT PRICE

leavt
&tck
St.crD

* I a«fc

G)'-*l

iA^ioa^

_2&

TOTAL
*

3

•

.3
^
4

LATE HOUR DELIVERY CHARGE
DRAYAGE
UMATAUt
REASON FOR EXCESSIVE
UNLOADING CHARGE

'

t.

BOND BEAM

•

SUB TOTAL

DOZ-M/CM C A D U I !

SEE REVERSE SIDE D

30 minutes free unloading time up to and including 6 cubic yards On orders over
6 yards an additional 5 minutes per yard will be allowed

WATER ADDED ON JOB
AT CUSTOMER S REQUEST
TRUCK

?"

"MATE!
SLUM-

Gal

_£/

THIS CONCRETE IS USED FOR

CONDITION O F S A L E :
All accounts due 15th of month following date of purchase In the event
payment is not made within 30 days after due date I or we agree to pay
if collection is made by suit or otherwise a reasonable attorney s fee
plus a FINANCE CHARGE of 2 % per month (ANNUAL PERCENTAGE
RATE 24%) and hereby waive ail ngnts to claim e t t m p t w a under state
laws Signature by owner or agent constitutes acceptance of the above

STATE TAX
TOTAL
AMOUNT:

IMPORTANT: Additional water
added to this concrete will reduce
its strength. Any water added is
at customer's o w n risk.

Our drivers will make every effort to
place matenal where Customer designates but the Company
assumes no responsibility for damages inside curb or property
line Customer agrees to terms of sale and delivery and
accepts concrete as is Due to important factors which are out
of our control after delivery this Company will not accept
responsibility for the finished results
No credit allowed for returned concrete
AH concrete air entrained unless otherwise specified

RECEIVED BY AND w
TERMS AGREED TO A

i
•4

L0AD

D E L I V E R Y CHARGE

EXCESSIVE UNLOADING CHARGE

FINISH LOAD •
WHEELBARROW •
TOPPING RA^FMFNT f~~i
PRANF irna ! I
CUSTOMER DELAY IN PLACEMENT •

PART

FOOTING •
FOUNDATION •
^ S T E P S ULr
,

WALL Q
PATIO | f l

; g f P E W A L K / & C U R B & GUTTER D

OWNER OR AGENT

F L O O R \Z

FORMS D R I V E W A Y

G
C

OTHER

C

APPENDIX V

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT #4
PERSONAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGE
RESPECTIVE POSSESSION AND VALUES
MONICA

DENNIS
VALUE

ITEM
4-WHEELER
CHINA CABINET

VALUE

ITEM

5,400.00 QzkJl TRUCK

CAR
CHAIR
TILLER

2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 6*db{*^
1,400.00
230.00
650.00

TOTALS

$9,680.00

x.

^PUUNTlFFSEXHIBr^
BMOTH0.
CASEN0.
96&-/0Q
DATERECD ^ . . _ w
IN EVIDENCE £ £ £ £ £ .
CLERK
A^cv

RING
COMPUTER
CAMCORDER
HEALTH RIDER
BAR STOOLS
HEADBOARD
LAWN EDGER
WASHER, DRYER, FRIGDIRT DEVIL VACUUM
ICE CREAM MAKER
GREEN CHAIRS
YARD DECOR.

16 ,000.00
2 ,200.00
Pic i*
3 ,400.00
^^fl
C\C\
p Us*.
1 f J D U • \j\J —
500.00
280.00
240.00
0
i/),
238.00
1K
tC
1 ,000.00
65.00
60.00
65.00
500.00

$25 ,898.00

